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T
his article reports on a case study of a leading project management firm in
engineering process plant contracting (EPPC), an internationalised industry that is
largely unresearched by HR specialists. The study examines how one such
company, `Exbeck’, has responded to external competitive pressures through a process of
internal restructuring.
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Exbeck made its corporate HR function a full business partner in
project management,  a controversial and risky move that recognised the strategic
potential of the function. In this role the function assumed executive control of
management development and, more controversially, began monitoring corporate and
divisional performance within project pre-planning and operations. 
The study was conducted over a ® ve-year period between 1990 and 1995, with repeat
interviews, participation in and observation of emergent organisational responses ±  in
particular senior management conferences, strategy and operational meetings and brie® ngs
on the repositioning of the HR function. Numerous structured interviews were conducted
and complemented by access to all Exbeck’s internal documents on its `Human resources
agent for change’  programme. The research methods that were employed ±  types and
numbers of people interviewed, method of interview and nature of data capture and
analysis ±  are discussed in Appendix 1.
The contribution of this study to practitioner and academic knowledge and debate is
threefold. First, it presents details of a rare attempt to make the HR function more strategic.
Secondly, this attempt is particularly interesting because, contrary to popular images of
HRM, it involves removing unilateral control from line managers by positioning the
corporate HR function in a `producer’ role in project management, ie centralising executive
responsibility for human resources rather than devolving it to line management. Thirdly, the
organisation has made a serious attempt to measure the impact of the changes on its
® nancial performance; this is interesting in that the impact of the repositioning of human
resources was measured in terms of `cost containment’  rather than `cost reduction’ . The
article presents and discusses data on these issues and concludes by discussing the wider
implications of its ® ndings.
COMPETITIVE FRAMEWORK AND CONDITIONS
The EPPC industry consists of about 100 ® rms worldwide whose primary business function
is to design, construct, procure and test investment projects for process producers. Process
producers operate in a variety of sectors: oil and gas (oil and gas refineries), chemical
production (eg eythelene or plastics), steel production (steel works), and the construction of
gas, oil or coal-powered electricity generating stations. In addition, contractors work on
unique engineering projects such as bridge construction, the Channel tunnel or extensions
to underground railway systems. Lastly, some EPPC ® rms work on nuclear power stations,
regenerating stations or storage plants. 
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The majority of the firms in the industry are multinationals, and work on projects is
undertaken worldwide. Capital projects, oil re® neries or chemical plants are initiated by
producer ® rms ±  oil companies or chemical producers ±  through a process of project tenders.
A producer ® rm may advertise in the trade press
2
or approach a number of project manage-
ment ® rms and invite tenders. Many projects are so large that project management ® rms
organise consortia bids or initiate particular joint ventures (see Clark and Ball, 1991). Process
producers prefer to offer tenders for ` lump sum turnkey’ contracts, where the price is speci® ed
for hardware, process technology and labour. The price may be ®` xed’ or, alternatively, it may
be subject to variation by an agreed formula for changes in the rate for materials or labour. 
Within EPPC there are three distinct types of ® rm: constructors, the best of which are
Japanese ® rms (Ball, 1985); process technology license holders, ie monopoly sources of
speci® c chemical or other technological processes, the majority of which are German or
British (Ball, 1985); and project managers such as Exbeck. In 1992 Exbeck employed 21,000
administrative, clerical and technical staff and 10,000 craft workers including engineers,
project managers, specialist process engineers, chemists and physicists. The value of work
performed in 1991 was $7.5 billion. The average cost of an Exbeck project is $85 million, but
some super projects can reach the order of $300 million. In capacity terms steam generators
for nuclear power stations can weigh up to 460 tons whereas aluminium smelters can have a
capacity of 200,000 tons per year. 
Project managers design projects, select constructors, procure the necessary technologies
and arrange and manage ® nance. They sell their technical expertise and person hours to the
client, oversee construction and process testing and manage, monitor and oversee the entire
project. In particular the project manager formulates the legal relationship between
themselves, process technologists, constructors and the client. 
The dangers of competitive failure and the presence of monopoly technology holders
preclude the use of large scale subcontracting, hence within consortia, joint venture or single
firm projects the opportunities for externalisation to cut labour and materials costs are
limited. Equally, patent speci® cations, statutory testing requirements and standards for tube
and valve pressures make it impossible for constructors to subcontract for materials
production on the basis of cost. Where firms do use subcontractors, it is usual for
constructors, technology holders or project managers to build up `partnering’  arrangements.
These are strategic alliances between EPPC ® rms, constructors and site subcontractors that
guarantee an annual workload in return for `ranged prices’ for the work (see Ball et al, 1992)
The constructor or project manager knows the quality of the work is guaranteed within a
range of tender prices. The bene® ts of this type of relationship are that the formulation of
tenders is more certain and the process builds up trust between interdependent firms.
However, the relationships still operate on the basis of a turnkey contract. And, as Clark and
Ball (1991) demonstrate, the opportunities  for cost minimisation thr ough direct
subcontracting are limited. But the use of consortia, joint ventures and partnering arrange-
ments do afford project managers opportunities to pass on potential costs to consortia or
joint venture partners by bringing de facto subcontractors into projects as full partners. 
Contemporary competitive conditions have tightened for four reasons. First, the market
price of oil has fallen considerably. As a consequence there is less oil re® nery business and,
in addition, on current projects the mark-up for project managers’ pro® ts has been severely
tightened. In the early 1980s the mark up was in the region of 20 per cent, whereas in 1995 it
stood at around 10 per cent. Secondly, industrial recession in western Europe has reduced
new orders for chemicals and steel plants. Recession led to the reduction of existing capacity
and similar reductions in mark-up capacities for project managers. Thirdly, the uni® cation of
Ian Clark, De Montfort University
15HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL ±  VOL 8 NO 2
Competitive pressures and engineering process plant contracting
16 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL ±  VOL 8 NO 2
Germany and the collapse of the eastern bloc has changed the nature of business.
Contractors are now in the business of bidding for clean-up work to make previously
unregulated chemical plants more environmentally friendly; equally, the availability of `new
capacity’ in eastern Germany has further reduced the demand for new starts in western
Germany. Lastly, environmental disasters such as those at Harrisburg, Chernobyl and
Bhopal have sharpened contractors’ awareness of potential legal liability.
Prior to 1992 Exbeck’s business strategy revolved around an internal power balance that
saw engineers  and project managers as the central actors or `kingpins’ . As Exbeck
approached the contemporary period, the central role of kingpins became problematic. In
particular budget overruns on projects often centred on HR issues that kingpins did not
recognise as signi® cant. Interviews and questionnaires carried out as part of this project
con® rmed the ® ndings of an Exbeck attitude survey which indicated that employees felt the
management-by-objectives structure in independent project management was breaking
down. In addition, many senior project managers and engineers who were interviewed
indicated that, during this period, corporate business managers and the marketing and
procurement department were bidding for and winning business which they did not want,
therefore overstretching the engineering and design functions. 
It appeared that Exbeck was running its operations as if boom conditions existed,
whereas competitive conditions and mark-ups were getting tighter. By late 1991 the
executive board decided that the situation was not sustainable; cash flow was a major
problem due to budget overruns and staff appraisals indicated widespread dismay at
engineer, project manager and site manager levels and huge frustration in HRM: 
They blame us all the while, but we have no idea what level and type of contracts they are
committing staff to. A typical response to us telling them there are no process design
engineers available is `well, go run a ® re drill then and ® nd one!’ 
Exbeck compromised on its human resources through a process of project ranking: `hot
projects’ could appropriate engineers, design staff and project managers from `cold projects’
at short notice. As the subsequent internal business review illustrated, the overall effect of
this was the implicit acceptance of cost overruns on some projects. Equally, the management
and deployment of human resources was completely reactive. Exbeck’s executive board
recognised that the HR function was currently what Purcell and Alhstrand (1994) term a
f`unctional third order priority’, operating downstream from decisions on the long-term
direction of the ® rm and its internal operating procedures. The latter represents ® rst and
second order levels of decision making, both of which have an upward in¯ uence on strategy.
In Exbeck the peripheral role of human resources manifested itself as responding to the
unilateral demands of project managers and maintaining personnel and employee relations
systems. In an effort to address this situation a wide-ranging business review was
undertaken that resulted in the current business and HR strategies.
COMPETITIVE STRATEGY
1. Business review and human resources
As a response to the crises of cash ¯ ow and cost overruns the board of directors initiated the
internal business review in conjunction with a well-known management consulting ® rm;
five interim findings were presented by the chief executive at Exbeck’s US corporate
headquarters. The dissemination of the findings was presented in a two-day review
conference at which the author was present. 
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First, it was made perfectly clear that the decline in project management work and project
management mark-ups were not temporary set-backs, as in the case of the 1972-1974 and
1979-1981 recessions. 
Secondly, it was argued that Exbeck had to be more selective over its bidding because,
while projects were becoming fewer, they were getting much larger, and therefore better
project forecasting and work execution excellence was necessary. That is, there was no point
in bidding for and winning work if it could not be resourced without budget overruns;
margins were smaller and eating into them was eroding pro® tability. As Exbeck sells human
resources as turnkey hours, either on design and procurement or on site in project
management, the situation was no longer sustainable. 
Thirdly, the labour intensive nature of EPPC precluded downsizing engineering and
project management staff in an effort to cut labour costs other than on the margin. Fourthly,
the Exbeck president reluctantly argued that it was essential for the HR function to be
reorganised and repositioned in project management as a `producer ’  rather than in its
current `go for’ role. That is, at corporate level the function had to be made a full business
partner in project management. In subsequent interviews with the president it was
established that his reluctance was not because he did not believe in the promotion of the
HR function; rather, he knew that such an initiative would seriously challenge the existing
hierarchy of staf® ng, ie the kingpin pro® le of engineers and project managers. 
Lastly, for clerical and administrative staff at corporate and divisional levels it was felt
necessary to introduce a `new deal’ because these staff had borne the brunt of much of the
confusion in business planning over the last three years. In consequence staff turnover was
running unacceptably high, whereas staff appraisals and employee attitude surveys
indicated that staff morale, trust and motivation were running at unacceptably low levels. 
The Exbeck board was unconvinced by the HRM rhetoric and immediate (transform-
ation) action plan presented to them by the commissioned management consultants. The
head of human resources referred to much of the American academic and consultant-based
work on HRM as `designer HRM’, arguing that it represented an `American tale’ of good
over bad. These views bear out British-based critiques of the American model (Guest, 1990
and Legge’s review of the `American dream’, 1995: 85-87). 
In essence, Exbeck wanted to harness its human resources more effectively in order to
maintain its competitive position within a tighter competitive environment. In contrast, the
consultants formulated a programme that was designed to raise Exbeck’s competitive
profile, which the board felt to be inappropriate. It was argued that attempts to raise
Exbeck’s competitive standing would add to their present dif® culties. In consequence any
attempt to raise the competitive pro® le was seen as misguided in the absence of rooting out
organisational failures in the ® rm’s business procedures. 
The board rejected the consultants’ recommendations and devised its own programme of
internal restructuring and management development. The aim of this was to contain
operational costs to levels that Exbeck had indicated it could meet in project pre-planning
and tender bids to process producers. The corporate HR function was identified as a
potentially signi® cant player in this process. The speci® c details of the business and HR
strategies are now outlined. 
2. Internal restructuring and management development
In order to address the tighter competitive environment, Exbeck introduced two innovations
at corporate level. First, it identif ied four cornerstones to its competitive strategy:
management development, technical excellence, work execution excellence and marketing
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and business planning excellence. Secondly, Exbeck streamlined its divisional structure into
five coherent divisions: legal and public relations, construction and contracts, human
resources, process and technological research and the European division controlling
petroleum and industrial chemicals production. Each division has an `executive sponsor ’
who is a member of the Exbeck executive board. The most significant aspect of these
innovations was that human resources became a division in its own right, whereas
previously it had been an operational unit responding to the resource and development
needs of line management. Executive sponsors are responsible for managing their particular
division but also have a brief to drive and steer one cornerstone of Exbeck’s competitive
strategy (see Figure 1).
The primary object of these innovations was to reform the management structure and
improve the internal delivery and resourcing of contracts. The introduction of these
developments was not seen as an internal transformation but more significantly as a
response to external competitive conditions. For example, `ownership’ of staff remained a
line function. However, previously kingpin engineers and project managers communicated
with and related to human resources at corporate and divisional levels through paperwork.
Interviews with HR managers indicated that this relationship was usually handled in a crisis
management, I` want it yesterday’, style. In order to reform this pattern of relationships the
managemen t development and technical excellence programmes focused on the
communication and competitive bene® ts of `project task forces’ (PTFs).
The PTF programme was introduced in a week-long training session for project
managers, corporate HR staff and engineering design, construction and site staff. The
intention was to bring a senior member of each division into the planning stage of any
FIGURE 1 Exbeck structure and competitive strategy
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particular tender which was usually won or bid for by the construction and contracts
division. Under the system the construction and contracts project manager prepares a
brie® ng document on the technical and process requirement of a project and provides a
forecasting plan for HR needs over the length of the project. PTF members from the other
four divisions then formulate their own costed plans for contracts, human resources, process
licenses etc. These are then fed back to the project manager in order for the bid to be
accurately costed. If the tender is subsequently won, the PTF `goes live’ with each division
organising the secondment of necessary staff. The HR function identi® es staff training and
development needs and works with the project manager to ensure accurate HR scheduling
to help contain costs to tender speci® cations. 
Initially there was considerable resistance from engineering and process technology staff
who, while accepting the inclusion of people from the HR function, did not consider them
`up to the job’ of live operations. Equally, although PTFs are autonomous groups for project
management, they remain under the executive control of the construction and contracts
group, whereas f`unctional task’ ownership rests with the appropriate task force division. For
example, human resources would staff a PTF on the basis of internal contracting, whereas
previously project and site engineers requested named individuals. A one to three-month rep-
orting period is targeted, depending on the size and complexity of the project, for initial form-
ulation of PTF costing and resource requirements. Figure 2 illustrates how a PTF operates. 
The PTF system challenged the internal hierarchy of staff at Exbeck but gave the ® rm a
more accurate business planning portfolio. Equally, PTFs gave Exbeck more accurate
costings for labour requirements at the pre-project stage; this was seen as a major bene® t in
that inaccurate internal costings and subsequent cost overruns could easily be identi® ed.
3 HRM as a full business partner
The corporate HR function was charged with responsibility for the management
development programme and monitoring corporate and divisional coherence in the
contemporary PTF framework for management practice. The renewed business strategy at
Exbeck clearly identi® ed the need for a developmental approach to the workforce; this was
summarised as ensuring delivered value in a PTF to demonstrate quality tenders and
quality added value to the client. For the executive sponsor of the HR function this entailed
four tasks. The ® rst was to position HR staff and services within PTFs in order to identify
and cost the human resource needs of the business at an early pre-planning stage. The
second was to demonstrate the bene® ts of an upstream competitive and HR strategy to line
managers in PTFs; thirdly, to show corporate HR staff that their presence within a PTF
system was valued and taken seriously; and, lastly, to demonstrate `empirically’ to clerical
and administration support staff throughout the organisation that non-engineering staff
were valued in the same way as technical and engineering staff. 
The head of human resources, its executive sponsor and the company president expressly
used the word `empirically’. In interviews they argued that Exbeck could not con® ne its dev-
elopment programme to managers alone and here the head of human resources argued this
was precisely the problem with `designer HRM’; for the employees it was merely rhetoric. To
avoid this the bene® ts of the PTF system had to be reproduced at lower levels in the ® rm;
administrative and clerical staff had to be involved with and participate in the PTF system.
This issue illustrated considerable forethought, to the extent that the head of human resources
was not thinking about ` transformation’, but how and why the PTF system might fail. 
Both the monitoring and recruitment measures were pushed through in order to
persuade engineers and project leaders to take the HR function seriously. However, it was
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made clear to the head of human resources that their job was not to exercise `fanciful’
control; rather, human resources at corporate level were briefed to use their position to
improve information and communication ¯ ows between themselves and project groups, in
order that the PTF system could operate effectively and to budget. The emphasis was on
human resource management, not necessarily human resources, managing the line.
To raise the internal pro® le of human resources to the status of a full business partner, the
executive sponsor and the head of human resources ¯ eshed out the HR agent for change
programme by focusing on three constituencies for corporate level operations ±  HR
agencies, agency targets and competitive bene® ts for Exbeck (see Figure 3 overleaf).
There were three agencies where intervening action was deemed necessary for the HR
function to establish itself as a full business partner. The ® rst was management practice which
was speci® cally targeted at project management in PTFs. The second was the overall HR
programme of initiatives which were directed to Exbeck’s business needs. These centred on
the training and development programme for line managers, HR managers ±  who were to be
positioned in the human resources PTF unit ±  and line staff who had to operate within the
new PTF system. The third area of active operations was the maintenance of employee
services, focusing on improving employee relations, compensation and benefits for non
engineering and project staff.
The training and development programme was targeted on two levels. The ® rst group
consisted of line managers in PTFs, including the human resources PTF unit. The thrust of
PTF training and development relates to Figure 2, where the PTF system is sketched out. The
corporate HR function briefs and trains up the ® ve corporate divisions in how PTFs are
designed to operate, in particular their internal reporting procedures. For the HR PTF unit
this involved attendance at day schools on project management in other corporate divisions,
whereas members of other corporate divisions had to attend HRM day schools. The object
was to make members of each corporate division think beyond their own function. After
attending four day schools beyond their specialist area, PTF members were asked to work
on a dummy bid, `Iceland refinery’ . Here, members had to complete a learning log
summarising their contribution to the management of the project and how it was improved
as a result of the PTF system ±  in particular how the inclusion of human resources people at
the preliminary stage had challenged their way of thinking.
The second target group for the training and development programme covered administ-
rative and clerical staff. In order to demonstrate its commitment to an upstream competitive
strategy, Exbeck initiated an employee attitude survey to assess what employees felt was
necessary at `ground level’ for them to participate in this innovation. The results were not
initially encouraging. (The author was allowed to examine the survey material and conduct
a small i`ndependent’ survey in the corporate headquarters and the London of® ce in order
to verify the company survey; the results of this second survey were consistent with those of
the ® rm.)
The main ® ndings of the survey were threefold. First, clerical and administrative staff felt
that they had no stake in the company and were continually `dumped on’  by engineers and
project managers who did not know how to take care of paperwork or show any interest in
the internal reporting systems. Secondly, support staff, including human resources, found it
difficult to maintain commitment to and identification with particular projects. Equally,
because staff were not seconded to work on particular projects, it became dif® cult to trace
problems or ® nd ® les when the project manager `demanded’ to know what had happened to
particular requisitions ±  often staff had moved to another project or in some cases left the
organisation. Thirdly, the majority of the support staff felt it was likely that they would lose
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their job as a result of the renewed business strategy; therefore they felt no need to commit to
or be interested in what was happening. As a response to this the head of human resources
sought to mirror the PTF approach at the operational level by formulating a system of
employee focus groups for clerical and administrative support staff. This was designed to
improve employee morale and trust in the wake of the attitude survey and disgruntled
soundings in employee review and appraisal sessions. 
The system of focus groups operates across divisions, whereby administrative and
clerical staff working on a particular PTF have the opportunity to liaise with staff in other
divisions. Equally, employee focus groups meet periodically to discuss how a project is
going and share problems they have experienced with PTF staff. PTFs have a de® ned roll of
members, therefore focus group staff are able to identify particular members they need to
see. Since 1996 focus groups and PTFs have been networked and now most communication
operates via e-mail. Yet, in the initial stages of a PTF, personal contact and visits between
members and focus group members remains the norm. After each periodic focus group
meeting a report is produced; these are picked up by the relevant task force, with any
defective or incomplete requisitions sent back to the originator in the PTF. Equally, employee
focus groups report to the HR function on how effectively a PTF is conducting its internal
business in terms of its paperwork facilitating speedy turnarounds.
As a second response Exbeck introduced an 18-day working month; all support staff were
given a paid day off every two weeks. A 37-hour working week was introduced, and as part
of the employee task force system support staff were encouraged, if the situation was urgent,
to act independently in sourcing service requests. For example, if a requisition was marked
urgent but was not correctly specified, costed or clearly signed off, support staff were
encouraged to use their experience and discretion. If such action was deemed incorrect by
the PTF, but undertaken in the absence of essential information, the PTF would have the
`worked time’ added to their budget and bid costs. At the initial stage engineers and project
managers did not take this seriously, but after about nine months they began to realise the
implications of failure to operate in a collegiate manner:
I cost my PTF $1million because I didn’t specify a particular process license request, and
when I checked the requisition and found it was the wrong process our support staff (in
contracts and construction) informed me that the situation could not be reversed and we had
to spend another $500,000 on the correct process license. What was ridiculous was that all the
correct details were in the tender. If I’d attached a ® le copy of the tender to an e-mail and not
written `process as usual’, the support staff would have found the correct speci® cation already
costed and drafted. A million dollars sounds a lot but in the context of a project tendered at
$300 million it’s not. But I had to work hard to get my section to meet the mark-up target. 
The interviewee added that in the old days he could have l`ost’ such a small cost error,
but now it is all clearly recorded. He added that he couldn’t even blame the `bozos in
personnel’. When asked what action he took as a result of this encounter he replied:
It’s not like the old days. They really mean business with this PTF and employee focus group
stuff; you can easily get a reputation as a waster and you don’t want that unless you want to
spend your next project management secondment on the Alaskan pipeline.
A year after the introduction of employee focus groups support staff appeared more
con® dent and valued by the engineers and project managers:
I’ve worked here for six years and, until last year, I never even saw an engineer and I don’t
know any socially. Now, if they waste something, they come down here and ask us if there is
anything we can do to sort it out and they actually listen to you.
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In summary, by incorporating support staff through employee focus groups, Exbeck
sought to demonstrate to the kingpins that they had to change the way they conducted
themselves. `Casual’ crisis management and poor paperwork were no longer acceptable,
particularly once a tender had gone live. 
In many respects the work of the HR function remained the same, but its strategic pro® le
was much higher. Many kingpins did not like this but gradually recognised its bene® ts. HR
planning at the tender stage became human resourcing, training and development or
recruitment at the stage when a tender went live. Previously, labour and process license
costings were estimates based on similar projects; now they were individual, more accurate
and helped preclude the norm of crisis management in the deployment of human resources.
The embedded competitive framework within EPPC clearly influenced Exbeck’s
management in their choice of business and HR strategies. This point is not necessarily new
(see Capelli, 1985; Kochan et al, 1984; Marchington and Parker, 1990 for a theoretically and
empirically-based discussion). However, the institutional apparatus and competitive
conditions found in this study are unique; for example, the competitive framework of
project tendering is long established and is unlikely to change. Further, Exbeck could not
respond to its business problems of the early 1990s by seeking to intensify its competitive
pro® le on the basis of `measured productivity improvements’; that is, headcount reductions
(more popularly termed downsizing) and more ¯ exibility.
The product market and market conditions were not necessarily deterministic but highly
in¯ uential. In terms of Cappelli and McKersie’s (1987) work on management strategies in
intensi® ed competitive conditions, Exbeck rejected an asset management approach based on
asset stripping and downsizing in favour of the described approach of value added and cost
containment. Value was added and costs contained between divisions by the PTF system,
where the corporate HR function operated as a task force producer. This approach bears out
Capelli and McKersie’s argument that competition based on quality and value is designed to
sustain the pro® tability of existing business or, in Exbeck’s case, to improve their marginal
ef® ciency within the embedded nature of competition in EPPC. 
The quality and value added in PTFs was supported by a management development
programme that was designed to secure corporate coherence across the five operating
divisions and internal operating coherence within divisions through the deployment of
employee focus groups. The measures of coherence were designed to secure more accurate
project bids and forecasts for HR needs. 
The financial benefits of the change process are difficult to determine but the chief
executive made it clear that some efforts had to be made here to justify the promotion of
human resources to the status of a full divisional business partner. As Figure 3 illustrates, the
potential competitive bene® ts of HR as a full business partner are measured qualitatively
and quantitatively and evaluated against competitive outcomes. It was decided to examine
aspects of the ® nancial and project performance for 1991 and compare it with 1992.
3
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE
In order to undertake this aspect of the project, quantitative data was examined from
published company accounts. In addition project data for the test cases was examined in
Exbeck’s corporate HQ and its London office from where the particular projects were
controlled. Further, several interviews with project managers and HR managers were under-
taken. The interviews with HR staff were particularly valuable because it was possible to
visualise their situation before and after the introduction of the human resources PTF unit. 
Competitive pressures and engineering process plant contracting
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The average value of an Exbeck project is $85 million. Currently, project management
mark-ups are in the order of 10 per cent. In the operating year 1992 Exbeck booked new
work to the value of $7.2 billion; this was costed and bid for under the PTF system.
To evaluate the financial contribution of the management and staff development
programme and the PTF system two courses of action were undertaken. First, for two
projects that started prior to the PTF system, the cost overrun was internally traced and
diagnosed (the audit trace system is described in Appendix 2). Secondly, two PTF-managed
projects were examined to evaluate any reduction in cost overrun in an attempt to estimate
the monetary value of including the human resources PTF unit in project pre-planning, bid
tender formulation and subsequent live operations.
The four projects under consideration are relatively similar in scale and cost, and
represent the average for an Exbeck project. The construction and testing period for the
projects was three years, so the two 1991 starts were completed in 1994 whereas the 1992
starts were completed in 1995. Both 1991 starts came in with a 5 per cent overrun on the
turnkey bid, ie $4.2 million or an annual average of $1.4 million. In contrast the PTF starts
came in with turnkey overruns of around $1million each or an annual average of $333,000.
The internal audit trace revealed several sources of cost overrun on the 1991 starts: site
contractor failures under subsequent litigation, adverse weather conditions that precluded
construction and testing, failures of process technologies and, in their second and third
years, both 1991 starts were behind schedule due to project management failures. The latter
included a failure to book design engineers in advance and problems associated with pro-
cess failures that were traced back to incorrect license requisitions by Exbeck, which in turn
held up construction by the process technologists. Further, Exbeck could not ®` nd’ enough
design, construction and project engineers who were available and trained up for particular
aspects of the projects. This failure triggered the crisis process of drafting in staff from other
projects and, in one case, headhunting a named individual from another corporation. 
The audit trace process indicated that half of the 1991 start overruns were attributable to
direct and indirect HR failures, in particular a failure of HR project pre-planning and associ-
ated training. In addition, the absence of the PTF system and employee focus groups meant
that errors or queries on requisition claims were not followed up or corrected. Not all of
these led to cost overruns but several did, with some creating very large additions to costs.
For the projects started under the PTF system, relatively little of the annual cost overruns
were attributable to HR failures; there were still some problems with the accuracy of process
license requests, but the system of employee focus groups picked this up. Here some
potentially costly errors were rescued when administrative staff queried the paperwork with
the appropriate PTF leaders. In summary, the internal audit trace indicated that on the two
1992 starts the promotion of the HR function into the PTF system saved Exbeck in the region
of $1.8 million per project (2 per cent of the tender price) in terms of reduced cost overruns.
The overall cost of the PTF system, the management and staff development programme
was around $4 million dollars. This ® gure includes the management consultancy fee and
extra provision for employer pension contributions, health care plans in the US and
corporate BUPA options in the UK, but excludes extra and higher wage payments. In
quantitative terms it is clear that the centralised strategic approach to HR planning and
development would pay for itself in under two years.
In qualitative terms employee morale and motivation were signi® cantly improved. All
groups, in particular design and project engineering staff, reported that the development
programme had signi® cantly improved their awareness of the bene® ts of cooperative and
collegiate working with other employees within and beyond the immediate PTF. Secondly,
Competitive pressures and engineering process plant contracting
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and related to the ® rst point, quality in work improved signi® cantly. This was especially the
case in administrative and clerical ® elds which supported a PTF. Staff reported that, by
being encouraged to take independent action (but being aware of project objectives), this
enabled them to anticipate potential problems while following through work assignments in
the employee focus group system. That is, staff felt that they now had a mechanism, if
necessary, to query, audit and check what they were being asked to do which was reported
back on very quickly. Thus the transmission mechanism of employee focus groups fed into
PTFs very effectively. 
Both of the above points were improved because of a third factor. The PTF system and the
overall development programmes illustrated the propriety of accurate costing, meeting
budgets and work schedules. In some cases employee focus groups queried requested work
and made alternative suggestions for lower cost works. Prior to the PTF system
administrative or clerical staff in any division never queried the requests of a kingpin, even
if they thought it was wrong. The accounts director and the head of human resources
introduced a management services guideline document on cost overruns which had to be
logged if the actual cost of labour, materials or licenses rose above the budgeted bid price.
These were then reviewed by the relevant project manager. As a measure of financial
discipline this innovation was mainly used against kingpins. Clerical and support staff saw
this as a positive move that further improved their morale, as previously they were usually
blamed because errors were not always traced back to source and, even if they were, some
project managers would write them off rather than challenge a fellow kingpin.
Lastly, Exbeck re-worked its performance review criteria and internal promotion and merit
pay systems. The emphasis was redirected to initiative, dependability, working with others,
effective internal communication and ® rst-time quality as factors which contributed directly
to standard performance measurement categories such as job knowledge and productivity.
CONCLUSIONS
Practitioner bodies ±  the IPD in the UK and the Society for Human Resource Management in
the US ±  are troubled by the observed ® nding that the HR profession is undervalued at
operational levels and unable to establish and justify a position at corporate level. Further,
research evidence (Storey, 1992; Purcell and Alhstrand, 1994; Sisson, 1994; Kochan and Dyer,
1995) indicates that the function is struggling to assert itself as a strategic actor, that
implementation of HR initiatives is piecemeal and that line managers are more active and
in¯ uential in this area that HR professionals. Moreover, the arguments of practitioner bodies
for a strong HR function are easily made (IPD, 1995), but must be empirically proven by
practitioners and scholars if corporate policy makers are to consider  the potential
contribution and signi® cance of human resources to `bottom line’ ® nancial performance. 
The evidence from this case raises wider and more contentious issues for practitioners
and scholars: What is best practice? Are ® rms such as Exbeck ahead of the practitioner and
academic communities? Exbeck established  a positive link between a strategically
repositioned corporate HR function and its ® nancial performance. The sample evidence
derived from four recent projects suggests that the previously peripheral role of the function
in project management did impair ® nancial performance. In contrast to this, full business
partnership led to a quanti® able improvement in ® nancial performance.
In Exbeck’s case organisational restructuring has led to a centralised, more strategic, HR
function where the quanti® able impact of the changes made are measurable and signi® cant.
The wider implications of this study and its contribution to practitioner and academic
debate are threefold. First, a consideration of the size and ® nancial magnitude of operations
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is instructive in assessing the role of human resources within a ® rm. The cost of a well
developed and strategically integrated HR function can be usefully positioned against a
® rm’s operations costs. This may help identify the potential for qualitative and quantitative
improvements in performance that derive from a more engaged deployment of human
resources, particularly at corporate level.
Secondly, corporate human resources staffed by quali® ed practitioners can operate as a
centralised strategic business partner and maintain integrity with line management if com-
petitive conditions in a ® rm’s product market encourage senior executives to commit to this. 
Thirdly, practitioners and scholars must recognise that even a centralised, strategically
integrated and interventionary HR function has, in economic terms, a marginal impact on
quantitative ef® ciency and qualitative improvement in the deployment of staff. The key
variables in this relationship are the cost of strategic integration and the operational returns
derived from integration. In Exbeck’ s case the quantifiable improvements in project
management vastly outweigh the qualitative and quantitative costs associated with the
process of internal restructuring that resulted in a more strategic role for human resources.
In the circumstances of this case the absence of a centralised and interventionary corporate
human resource function was not sustainable. 
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Notes
1 Contacts for this study were established as a result of work on the ESRC programme,
`The competitiveness of British industry’ (contract no. W. F. 20250031). Subsequent work
and the cost of international travel was funded by a grant from Leicester Business School.
Because of the highly competitive nature of business in EPPC ±  in particular the bidding
process ±  it has not been possible to use the real name of the case ® rm. 
2 For example, European Chemical News, the Financial Times or Hydrocarbon Processing.
3 This information is highly sensitive and has been disguised for competitive reasons. 
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Appendix 1
Formal interviews were conducted with the corporate head of human resources and the HR
policy leaders in each section at this level. Over the course of the project follow-up inter-
views were held after signi® cant organisational innovations such as the PTF system. The
author was able to attend and participate in strategy meetings and brie® ng sessions. From
1994 Exbeck held some strategy meetings in human resources via video conferences; in these
cases the author was able to `attend’ and `participate’ from the London divisional of® ce. The
chief executive was interviewed on the emergent system and the use of executive sponsors.
Exbeck made all internal HR documents available. In addition the author was able to
attend some employee appraisal and performance rankings for individual employees and
employee focus groups. In both cases independent notes were taken which were used in
individual interviews between employees and the author.
The attitude survey examined employee views on the division between kingpins and
administrative and clerical staff, other weaknesses in work organisation and impediments to
meeting performance targets under the kingpin system of project management. 
Interviews with project managers posed more of a problem. Initially the author was
`identified’  as a management consultant. Once this problem was overcome resistance
subsided. However, throughout the project the attitudes of project managers to the PTF
system only moved from one of distrust to reluctant acceptance.
Appendix 2
Audit tracing was conducted in the construction and contracts division at corporate HQ and
the London divisional of® ce. The process involved checking original tender bids against
work-off costs and project pro® ts. The system was accurate but blunt; for example, in some
cases it was not possible to ® nd data, so original tender bids were used in calculations, and
thus the trace may have underestimated cost overruns.
Data on labour costs, training, HR planning and scheduling and recruitment was traced
by testing ® nal costs against book costs. The same process was used for materials, plant
and other requisitions. Apportioning responsibility for overruns was contentious and in
interviews which included human resources and project managers there were
irreconcilable differences.
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